Denver Law Review
Volume 37

Issue 2

Article 2

January 1960

One Year Review of Property
Richard L. Eason

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr

Recommended Citation
Richard L. Eason, One Year Review of Property, 37 Dicta 89 (1960).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

MARCH-APRIt

1960

DICTA

ONE YEAR REVIEW OF PROPERTY
By RICHARD L. EASON

Member of the Denver firm of Dawson, Nagel, Sherman
and Howard
In 1959 the Colorado Supreme Court decided approximately 36
cases involving various phases of general property law. The most
significant cases involved oil and gas and water law.
Oil and Gas
The Supreme Court denied rehearing in the case of Corlett v.
Cox' in which the owner of the fee had conveyed by warranty deed
containing the following reservation: "It is, however, further
agreed and distinctly understood that Carl A. Holcomb hereby reserves 61/4% of all gas, oil and minerals that may be produced on
any or all the above mentioned land, or in other words reserves
of the usual 1/8 royalty .... -"2 There was no oil and gas lease outstanding against the land at the time of the conveyance. The district court of Weld County held that the grantor had reserved a
1/16 interest in the mineral fee estate. Plaintiffs-in-error contended that the above words reserved a perpetual non-participating royalty interest of 61/4%. The Supreme Court affirmed the holding of
the trial court. It directed attention to a 1954 oil and gas lease
wherein both plaintiffs and defendants had joined as lessors and
felt the parties had treated the interest reserved as a 1/16 mineral
interest. The court also laid emphasis on the fact that here was no
oil and gas lease in exisence at the time of the reservation. In quoting from an Oklahoma case 3 it said: "There was at the time of the
conveyance . . . no oil and gas lease upon the property and in a

strict sense there
were no royalty rights to reserve or deal with in
4'
any manner.
In the Corlett case the Supreme Court affirmed Simpson v. Langholf,5 which was theretofore considered a questionable case, and in
effect held that no perpetual non-participating royalty interest can
be created where there is no existing oil and gas lease on the premises at the time of the attempted creation. Thus, the words of Lord
Coke quoted in the Simpson case:
If a man seized of land in fee by his deed granteth to others the profits of those lands to have and to hold to him
and his heirs and maketh livery, sucundum, forman, chartae the whole land itself doeth pass. For what is the land
but the profits thereof? 6
seem to have application today notwithstanding modern-day property concepts applied and relied upon in the oil and gas industry.
A confusing case was Radke v. Union Pac. R.R.,T in which an
action was brought by owners of certain Logan County land to re1 138 Colo. 325, 333 P.2d 619 (1959).
2 Id. at 327, 333 P.2d at 620.
3 Pease v. Dolezal, 206 Okla. 696, 246 P.2d 757 (1952).
4 138 Colo. at 332, 333 P.2d at 622.
5 133 Colo. 208, 293 P.2d 302 (1956).
6 Id. at 214, 293 P.2d at 306.
7 138 Colo. 189, 334 P.2d 1077 (1958).
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move a cloud from their title alleged to exist by reason of the following reservation contained in a deed to plaintiffs' predecessors:
Reserving, however, to the said Union Pacific Railway
Company the exclusive right to prospect for coal and other
minerals within and underlying said land and to mine for
and remove the same if found, and for this purpose it shall
have right-of-way over and across said lands and space
necessary for the conduct of said business8 thereon, without charge or liability for damage therefor.
The court held that the quoted language created a mere license
subject to revocation before its exercise by the railroad rather than
a mineral reservation or exception from the grant. The court further held that because it was a mere license, and subject to revocation by the owner of the fee, revocation followed ipso facto by the
conveyance of the land by the fee owner to a third party. It was
further held that the license in the instant case was not an interest
in property, such as an incorporeal hereditament, but that it was
something separate and distinct from an interest in property, being
merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful. The court alluded to the fact that some types of licenses were
irrevocable (those coupled with a grant in presentae and those
coupled with an interest) but went on to hold that the license in the
instant case was neither coupled with a grant nor coupled with an
interest, and thus revocable prior to being exercised. The court
stated that in order to create a severance of9 the mineral estate such
as was recognized in Mitchell v. Espinoza, the severance must be
by clear and distinct wording in the conveyance. The Radke case
cannot be considered as an important precedent because it must of
necessity be limited to the language contained and used in the specific form of reservation in question. It does contain interesting
language with respect to the nature and definition of licenses and
to the necessity of precise draftmanship in creating or reserving
mineral interests.
In Farnik v. Board of County Comm'rs,10 the plaintiff had acquired property from the county, which in turn had acquired title
by treasurer's deed. In its pre-1949 deed, the county had reserved
minerals. Both the plaintiff and the county had executed oil and
gas leases. Plaintiff sought to quiet title against the outstanding
mineral interest of the county on the basis that the county had no
authority to reserve minerals, in that its powers and duties in acquiring and disposing of real property for non-payment of taxes are
defined by the revenue statutes" rather than the general laws defining powers of boards of county commissioners. Without ruling
on the power of counties to reserve minerals before 1949, the court
held that the 1949 Session Laws 12 validated and confirmed previous
reservations of minerals and oil and gas leases issued by counties
thereunder. The court held that the validating act applied to minerals acquired by counties by tax foreclosure, but went on to hold
that county authority was only to purchase and hold real property
8

9
10
11
12

Id. at 195-96, 334 P.2d at 1081.
125 Colo. 267, 243 P.2d 412 (1952).
341 P.2d 467 (Colo. 1959).
Colo. Rev. Stat. ch. 36, art. 11 (1953).
Sess. Laws 1949, Ch. 140.
Co.
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for county use and that no power was granted to hold reserved
minerals for purposes of speculation. Thus counties have no power
to retain reserved minerals where a county purpose or use no longer exists and reserved minerals must be sold and reinstated to the
tax rolls as soon as possible after reservation.
In the case of Clovis v. Pacific N.W. Pipeline Co.,l3 plaintiff had

executed an oil and gas lease involving 632 acres of land to defendant's predecessors. The lease contained no voluntary pooling
or unitization clause. The defendant drilled a producing well in the
north half of section seven in which the plaintiff owned fifty-two
acres, but the well was not drilled on plaintiff's land. After commencement of the well, the Oil and Gas Conservation Commission
ordered the north half of section seven pooled. Later the defendant
drilled a producing well in the south half of section six. This well
was drilled on plaintiff's land and the south half of section six was
likewise pooled by order of the Commission. The defendant ceased
paying delay rentals on leased lands not within the pooled units and
plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment as to whether the producing wells within the two pooled units validated defendant's lease
as to land outside the units. The court held that the drilling of a
producing well within a unit validates the outside acreage contained within the same lease whether the well is on leased lands or
not, and further that the lessor is protected as to non-unitized lands
by the application of implied covenants for reasonable development
and protection against drainage and that such covenants existed independent of the primary term.
Water Rights
In Cresson Consolidated Gold Mining & Milling Co. v. Whitten,'1 4 the owners of adjudicated water rights on a stream sought to
enjoin two mining companies from impounding water, which the
companies claimed to have developed by driving lateral tunnels. It
was alleged by the plaintiffs that the water, if released, would flow
through the main tunnel into the stream in which their rights had
been adjudicated. The plaintiffs asserted that the water was tributary to the stream and the mining companies claimed that the water was developed water and thus not tributary. The trial court
granted the injunction against the impounding of the water with13 345 P.2d 729 (Colo. 1959).
14 338 P.2d 278 (Colo. 1959).
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out allowing the mining companies to adduce evidence that the
water was in fact developed and not tributary. In so doing the trial
court held that it would consider no evidence as to rights of ownership other than rights that had been adjudicated. The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the refusal by the trial court to consider evidence of ownership other than adjudicated priorities was
error in that adjudication was not necessary to the acquisition of
rights. The court stated that, "An adjudication only confirms that
which has already been accomplished.' 1 5 The court further stated
that the mining companies were entitled to prove their rights even
though not previously adjudicated and failure to allow proof was
a denial of due process. The court went on to restate the rule that
all waters are presumed tributary but held that the mining companies were entitled to adduce proof to overcome this presumption.
On June 22, 1959, the Supreme Court decided the much publicized South Platte Water Conservancy District case.16 In this case
originating petitions were filed under the Water Conservancy Act 17
with the District Court of Weld County for the creation of a water
conservancy district of designated boundaries and for stated purposes. Protesting petitions and objections were filed but later dismissed by the trial court after hearing. At the hearing on the sufficiency of the originating petitions, before any evidence was taken,
counsel for petitioners moved to amend the originating petitions to
exclude lands of objectors from the district. The trial court granted
the motion to amend, thereby excluding the lands of objectors and
protestants from the proposed district. Subsequently, an original
proceeding in the nature of quo warranto was instituted in the
Supreme Court by the attorney general to test the legality of the
formation of the district and the rights of its directors to hold office.
The court held that it could review the entire record of the proceedings before the trial court in the quo warranto proceedings, and
that the record to be searched included testimony and all matters
considered by the trial court. Reviewing the record, the court held
that the trial court erred in granting petitioners' motion to amend,
as the statute gave the court power to allow amendments to correct
"errors in the description of the territory" ' only, and that petitioners motion was patently not for this purpose. The court held further
that in allowing petitioners' motion to exclude the properties of
objectors the trial court violated the rights of the original signatories to the petitions, in that after the exclusion the petitions no
longer described the "territories to be included in the proposed
district" as required by statute. The court stated that it could not
be assumed that any one of the petitioners would have signed had
he known that the district to be created would be substantially
different from that represented to him by the instrument which
he had signed. The court further held that the Water Conservancy
Act did not give the trial court jurisdiction to determine what district is desirable or in the public interest but rather limited the
trial court's function to supervising strict compliance with the
statutory procedure.
15 Id. at 283.
16 People ex rtel. Dunbar v. South Platte Water Conservancy Dist., 343 P.2d 812 (Colo. 1959).
17 Colo. Rev. Stat. 1 149-6-41 (1953).
18 343 P.2d at 818.
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In the case of Saunders v. Spina,19 plaintiffs and defendants
were users of water from the same ditch. Plaintiffs brought an
action to enjoin defendants from interfering with their asserted
rights to use water in the ditch and for damages. Plaintiffs claimed
one half interest in all the water allocated to the ditch by virtue of
an 1890 ditch decree. The court reaffirmed the rule that a decree
entered in a ditch adjudication is not determinative of ownership
of various water priorities as between users, stating, "A ditch decree merely awards the ditch its proper number and adjudicates
the amount of water to which it is entitled from water priorities
which will use it."'20 The court further held that the burden was
upon the plaintiffs to show either a better record title than defendants or that defendants had abandoned or waived prior rights to
which defendants had proved title. The court held that such burden
was not sustained and that abandonment is not to be presumed,
stating, "Nor shall the owner of the right be held to have surrendered it or21merged it except on reasonably clear and satisfactory evidence."
In the case of Nesbitt v. Jones,22 the plaintiff sued to quiet title
to seventy-five inches of water allegedly conveyed to plaintiff's
predecessors in 1879. In 1928 plaintiff's predecessor exchanged
another 150-inch water right to the canal company for shares of
stock in said company. The court held that the 75-inch right was
lost to the canal company by adverse use, holding that the use of
the seventy-five inches became adverse in 1928 when other rights
were exchanged for shares in the company. The court stated, "The
entire purpose of this transaction was to transform the previous
relationship from one of priority so to speak . . .to a relationship
of tenancy in common whereby the Post farm would share with
the other canal company stockholders . . . ",23 The court held that
the transaction served to notify plaintiff that the company recognized no other or further right and that such notification transformed a previous permissive use to an adverse use which had
continued for the statutory period.
Mechanic's Liens
24

Hayutin v. Gibbons was a case in which a materialman, sued
the owner of property (in which the materials were incorporated in
improvements) for the value of materials furnished. The owner
defended on the ground that he had entered into a statutory contract with the contractor and that the same had been recorded according to law. The court held that though the recording of the
statutory contract may limit the extent to which the owner's property may be subject to liens it does not limit personal liability for
goods furnished. The court stated that the Mechanic's Lien Act 25
does not extend an exclusive remedy to claimants but merely affords statutory lien rights and when, as here, the materialman was
able to prove a personal promise on the part of the owner or his
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

344 P.2d 469 (Colo. 1959).
Id. at 473.
Id. at 474.
344 P.2d 949 (Colo. 1959).
Id. at 955.
338 P.2d 1032 (Colo. 1959).
Colo. Rev. Stat. 9 86-3-1 (1953).
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agent to pay for materials furnished he could recover the value
thereof.
In the case of Sontag v. Abbott, 26 the holders of mechanic's

liens for labor and material sought to foreclose their liens, naming
as a party defendant a purchase money mortgagee. It appeared
that the holder of an option to purchase the property ordered materials which were delivered to the premises the day prior to the
delivery of the warranty deed to him. The trial court held that
the mechanic's liens were superior to the purchase money deed of
trust as they related back to the date of commencement of work
(which was held in this case to be the date materials were first
delivered to the premises), which was prior to the recording of the
purchase money deed of trust. The Supreme Court affirmed the
holding of the trial court that the optionee who caused delivery of
the building materials to the premises, and whose rights later
ripened into fee ownership, was an "owner" for purposes of the
Mechanic's Lien Act with power to charge the property with a lien.
The court further held that the delivery of materials was the "commencement of work" under the statute to which priority of liens
related, (citing International Trust Co. v. Clark Hardware Co.2 7 )

and since the materials were delivered to the premises prior to
recording of the deed of trust the mechanic's liens were superior.
The court further held that the fact that the deed of trust secured
a purchase money loan did not entitle it to any preference in that
the statute provided that mechanic's liens "shall have priority over
26 344 P.2d 961 (Colo. 1959).
27 66 Colo. 210, 180 Pac. 579 (1919).
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any and every lien or encumbrance subsequently intervening. ' 8
The court stated that had the legislature intended to make an exception of purchase money mortgages it would have so provided.
Mining Law
In McNulty v. Kelly29 an action was brought challenging defendant's title to certain placer mining claims by the locators of
overlapping claims. The defendant's claims were prior in time but
plaintiff alleged that they were invalid because located as if on
publicly surveyed land. The defendant's location certificates described the property located "by legal subdivisions of public land
survey" when in fact the land had not been surveyed by the federal
government. The court found the descriptions contained in defendant's location certificates sufficient where a reasonable man, by
using the description and other evidence, could determine the location involved. The court held that the description need not assume
the formality required to prove title for patent purposes and that
location certificates may contain a description of the land by section
numbers not based on an official United States Government survey.
The court further held it to be a question of fact whether the location certificate adequately described the claim, and that the trial
court in the instant case had before it sufficient evidence to prove
that the claim could be located from the description set forth in
the certificate.
Landlord and Tenant
The case of Hix v. Roy 3" added little to the law of landlord and
tenant but is worthy of mention here if only to indicate that the
statutory prerequisites to actions under the Forcible Entry and
Detainer Statute3 1 will be strictly applied. The landlord, one of
two co-lessors, brought an FED action to evict the tenant. It appears
that a notice was sent to the tenant stating that if certain conditions
were not met and correction made the landlord would exercise the
right to terminate the lease. The court held that such a notice was
deficient and did not comply with the requirements of the statute
in that it was conditional and did not unequivocally terminate the
lease pursuant to the terms thereof. The court said, "A notice to
terminate a lease generally to be effective must be unequivocal and
unconditional and must be such as to be fully understood by the
recipient."" The court further held that the failure of the co-lessor
to join in the notice and attempted termination of the lease rendered the notice defective; that in the absence of agency (which is not
presumed and must be established), one tenant in common cannot
give notice for all without consent. Thus the notice on its face
could only be effective, if at all, as to the tenant in common so
acting.
GENERAL REAL PROPERTY
3

In the case of Smith v. Town of Fowler," the town brought an
action to quiet title to "Lot 1, north of the river in Section 16 ......
28 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 86-3-6 (1953).
29 346 P.2d 585 (Colo. 1959).
30 340 P.2d 438 (Colo. 1959).
31 Colo. Rev. Stat. 1 58-1-1 (1953).
32 Ibid. at 440.
33 138 Colo. 359, 333 P.2d 1034 (1959).
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The defendants, owners of adjoining land, answered and claimed
title for themselves. It appeared that an 1870 government survey
had established the meander line of the southerly bank of the Arkansas River and had platted lands to the south thereof. It further
appeared that a subsequent government survey had platted lands
north of the meander line established by the 1870 government survey. The patent to the lot in question described the land as "North
of Arkansas River . . . according to the official plat of the survey
of said lands returned to the General Land Office. . . ." The official

survey showed the south boundary of Lot 1 as being the meander
line as established. It appeared that Lot 1 was actually south of the
Arkansas River and the defendants thus claimed title on two
grounds, accretion and adverse possession. The defendants claimed
that the north boundary of their property (the south boundary of
Lot 1) was the thread line of the Arkansas River as the same existed
and as the river had moved north Lot 1 had been absorbed by accretion and therefore belonged to defendants.
The court cited Hanlon v. Hobson3 4 for the general rule, wherein the court stated, "[W]here, as here, in a deed conveying lands
an unnavigable river itself is named as a monument, the grant
extends to its center and the thread of the stream is its true boundary. ' '35 The court noted the further rule that the owner of lands
bounded upon an unnavigable stream is benefited or his holdings
impaired by changes in the course of the stream occurring gradually over a period of time. The court held, however, that an exception to the general rule existed where the parties to the conveyance
intended otherwise, and held that the wording "according to the
official plat thereof" in the United States patent to the lot in question referred to the official government survey of the meander line
which was intended to be the south boundary of Lot 1. The court
found sufficient evidence to sustain the trial court's finding that
the meander line was intended to be used as a boundary and held
that where the meander line is intended to be so used accretion
cannot come into being. The court dismissed the adverse possession
claim of defendants, holding that the mere pasturage of cattle on
unfenced land cannot be regarded as hostile or adverse.
In the case of Western Motor Rebuilders, Inc. v. Carlson,36 the
plaintiffs conveyed lots to defendant "subject to the protective
covenants as shown on the official plat thereof on file in the office
34 24 Colo. 284, 51 Pa. 433 (1897).
35 Id. at 288, 51 Pat. at 435.
36 138 Colo. 404, 335 P.2d 272 (1959).

YOUR OFFICE SAFE
may be safe enough for ordinary purposes but your important documents

should be in a SAFE DEPOSIT BOX in our new modern vault, designed
for both safety and convenience.

A whole year for as little as $5 plus tax.

COLORADO

STATE

BANK

Member Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
OF DENVER -

SIXTEENTH AT BROADWAY

MARCH-APRIL

1960

DICTA

of the Clerk and Recorder of Grand County, Colorado." 37 The
plaintiffs claimed a violation of the protective covenants by defendant and asked the court for an injunction, damages and for a decree
declaring forfeiture of title. 'The defendant asserted that it had
purchased the property prior to the establishment of protective
covenants, and that further the plaintiffs' action was barred by
laches, estoppel and waiver. The Supreme Court reversed judgment
of the trial court awarding the injunction, holding that where the
defendant had paid the full purchase price for the lots and has been
given possession thereof he had acquired the entire equitable title
and thereafter the plaintiffs held only a bare, naked legal title in
trust for the defendant. Thus, the plaintiffs could not impose restrictive covenants on the land without the defendant's consent.
The court stated that the plaintiffs had actually, though unknowingly, performed "livery of seisin" in that the parties went upon
the land to be conveyed and observed the boundaries thereof, and
the defendant, having paid the full purchase price, was put in possession. The court held that from that time on the defendant was
the full equitable owner of the property and not bound by protective covenants recorded thereafter without his consent.
The deed to defendant was dated November 6, 1951 and the
protective covenants were not recorded until November 27, 1951.
The court said, "The deed referred to the condition of the records
as they existed on November 6, 1951 and that is all this grantee
could be bound by."'38 The court also found the plaintiffs barred by
laches and estoppel.
The case of Friend v. Stancato39 involved a change in the point
of diversion of water from a ditch. The petitioner asked for a decree
allowing her a change in point of diversion of certain water rights.
The protestant claimed ownership of the water rights involved and
offered to prove his ownership thereof by offering a deed in evidence which was given to his grantor for purposes of correcting the
omission of water rights from a prior deed. The corrective deed
offered was not acknowledged or delivered to the grantee named
therein, but was delivered to the attorney for the protestant. The
protestant made an offer of proof but the court denied admission
of the deed in evidence. The Supreme Court, in reversing judgment
of the trial court, held that an unacknowledged deed may be effective as a conveyance if execution and delivery thereof are proven
by competent evidence. Delivery of the corrective deed to the successor in interest of the grantee named therein was held sufficient
delivery to validate the same where the grantor intended to convey
title thereby. The after-acquired title doctrine applied to vest title
in the successor of the grantee named in the deed.
The case of Gaines v. City of Sterling0 was an action involving
a boundary dispute between owners of two adjacent tracts of land
registered under the Torrens Title Registration Act. 41 Plaintiff
brought an action under rule 10542 to obtain an adjudication of the
location of the common boundary line. The court concluded rule 105
37 Id. at 407, 335 P.2d at 278.
38 Ibid.
39 342 P.2d 643 (Colo. 1959).
40 342 P.2d 651 (Colo. 1959).
41 Colo. Rev. Stat.
42 Co o. R. Civ. P. 105.
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did not apply but held that the complaint stated a claim for relief
under applicable statutory proceedings. 43 The plaintiff contended
that under the Torrens Act a title once registered becomes "forever

binding and conclusive upon all persons."' 44 The court held that the

Torrens Act can have no application to the settlement of a boundary
dispute unless the dispute was adjudicated in the registration proceedings.
The trial court appointed a commissioner to determine the
north-south center line (the line in dispute) of the section. The
commissioner platted the line without reference to the section
corners but by tying to points three miles distant and correlating
his calculations with an old ditch filing, an abandoned road and
other obscure monuments. The commissioner's platting of the northsouth center line resulted in 2578 feet on one side of center, and
2740 feet on the other side of center, on the north line of the section.
The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in accepting the
commissioner's findings, stating that the rule of single apportionment should have been applied by locating the section corners first
and then locating the north quarter corner as equidistant between
the section corners. Thus where section and quarter section corners
have been obliterated and there is an interior boundary line dispute
with no adequate evidence before the trial court of the correct possessory lines, the correct rule to determine an interior quarter section line as stated by the court "is first to relocate the exterior section corners and then proceed to locate the quarter section corners
by applying the procedure set out in CRS 136-1-1. This statute applies the principle of the single apportionment rule. ' 45

In Scott v. Powers,46 plaintiff's land was bounded on the north
by a state highway and on the east by a county road. Plaintiff conveyed a portion of his land to defendant's predecessors "subject,
however, to the right-of-way for roads and ditches as now constructed, it being the intention hereof to exclude the county road
from this conveyance. '47 The trial court found that no access road
to plaintiff's land had ever existed as claimed so that none could
be reserved under the wording "as now constructed." The plaintiff
further claimed an easement by prescription. The court correctly
held that while parcels of land are under a common ownership, no
43 Colo. Rev. Stat. 1 118-11-1 (1953).

44 Cola. Rev. Stat. 1 118-10-30 (1953).
45 342 P.2d at 656.
46 342 P.2d 664 (Colo. 1959).
47 Id.

at 665.
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rights by prescription can accrue against any future servient
portion.
An interesting case is American Lutheran Church v. Evangelical Lutheran St. Paul's Church.48 The American Church brought
an action to have a deed to the Evangelical Church declared null
and void. It appeared that plaintiff's congregation met and voted
to disband. Three individuals were selected to execute the deed in
question to defendant. Plaintiff's constitution vested the power to
convey real property in the board of trustees. The Supreme Court
held that the purported conveyance by the designated individuals
under the attempted action and authority of the congregation was
void and illegal as ultra vires. This case should serve as a lesson
for those who contemplate the purchase of property from religious
corporations to search the constitution and by-laws of the corporation for the appropriate method of conveying real estate.
In the case of Clopine v. Kemper,4 9 the plaintiff sought to quiet
title against defendant's rights, if any, arising by virtue of the filing
of a lis pendens in a divorce action. The defendant had filed a lis
pendens describing the real property involved which stated the
names of the parties and the nature of the claim asserted in the
action. Subsequently, plaintiff purchased the property and sought
to quiet title against the lis pendens. Plaintiff asserted that the lis
pendens was of no force and effect in that the complaint in the
divorce action did not describe "any real property." The trial court's
entry of judgment against plaintiff was affirmed by the Supreme
Court. In its opinion the Supreme Court held that under rule
105(f)50 it is no longer necessary to describe the real property involved in the complaint but such property need only be described
in the recorded lis pendens. The court stated, "It is the notice of
lis pendens and not the pleadings which give constructive notice of
pending litigation affecting interests in realty."5 1 The court held
further that the divorce action was a proper subject of lis pendens
where division of property was sought.
Plaintiff also urged for reversal that the lis pendens was void
in that it was recorded three days before the complaint was filed
in the civil action. The plaintiff cited rule 105(f) which provides,
"After filing any pleading wherein affirmative relief is claimed ...
a party may file . . . a notice of lis pendens .... "M2 The court disposed of this argument by holding that the action had commenced
upon the issuance of summons and that the lis pendens filed thereafter was valid. This would seem to be contrary to the wording of
the rule, but as the court stated, it was immaterial whether notice
of the lis pendens began running July 3 or July 6 as the plaintiff
had purchased the property more than two years after the lis
pendens was recorded and thus was in no position to rely upon a
technical non-compliance with the rule.
48 343 P.2d 711 (Colo.
49 344 P.2d 451 (Colo.
50 Colo. R. Civ. P. 105
51 344 P.2d at 454.
52 Colo. R. Civ. P. 105
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